Transcript--Graham Fuller / Joost Lagendijk--Turkey and EU

Turkey's Foreign Policy Issues: Turkey and EU

Featuring

Graham Fuller and Joost Lagendijk

Graham Fuller: Thank you, Ian. I’m sure we’ll have more to say about Iran later. I’d just like to offer one quick thought on the question of democratization in Turkey here. I am often struck by how much Washington and American political culture in general seems to assume that the more democratic a country becomes the better relations it will have with Washington. So if you overthrow Saddam a new democratic Iraqi regime will like you. Or if you can bring democracy to other states they would be more pro-American. There seems to be an unconscious reluctance in our own ideology of  democracy to acknowledge that there can be some genuine differences of interest among even democratic states. Yes, two democratic states are unlikely to go to war with each other, but under democratic governance an outspoken public could still express even more vehemently those differences that exist between them. Democracy is not changing the game.

Next we turn to Joost Lagendijk to discuss Turkey and the EU in greater detail.   

Joost Lagendijk: It’s always a challenge to explain the EU to a Washington audience, let alone EU-Turkish relations. I sometimes assume that people know how the EU works, but that seems not always to be the case.

            I will distinguish three different levels on which events play out. One is the official—I might say the level of technical negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Second, there is the issue of political reforms inside Turkey that are required to bring it closer to EU membership. And third, there is the realm of public opinion, the public debate inside both the EU and in Turkey.

            Let’s look first at the technical negotiations between basically civil servants from the European Commission and Turkish civil servants to bring Turkish laws into line with the so-called “EU Acquis”. That started in 2005 and is divided into 35 chapters  or arenas of discussion. That is important. These chapters can only be opened or closed by unanimous agreement—unanimity among all 27 EU member states on the issue.

            Now the problem is that half of these chapters-- 18 to be precise--are blocked. They cannot be opened, let alone closed. Because either the EU itself, or France, or Cyprus have unilaterally declared that they don’t want these chapters to be opened. And because they have a veto right they won’t be opened. That means that at the end there are four remaining chapters left to be opened. It is up to Turkey to meet these so-called benchmarks or criteria. That might happen this year. Or it might happen at the beginning of next year. When that has happened we have then run out of chapters to be negotiated. Technically we can’t then undertake any further negotiations about Turkish EU membership until new chapters are unblocked.

            In this respect, what happens to Cyprus problem is crucial. I would need another fifty minutes or more to explain the Cyprus issue. But as you know there are negotiations taking place on the island between Greece and Turkey to find a solution. Being an optimist, I think there is a 50-50 % chance that a solution will be found. That is important for Turkey-EU relations, because if there is a solution, if there is a deal between the two communities on the island, then a lot of these blocked chapters would be opened up. And Turkey and the EU can then continue negotiations even after the four present chapters have been opened. If there is no deal, then we face serious deadlock in Turkey-EU negotiations at the end of this year or beginning of next year.

            Now I want to state that, even if it is poorly understood in Turkey or in the EU, even if there is a deadlock I am convinced that EU will never decide to truly stop the negotiations. It is important to understand this: for procedural reasons to stop the negotiations you also require unanimity. And that unanimity will never be there, for political reasons. Countries like the UK, Sweden, Spain, Italy, strong defenders of Turkey’s EU membership, will never agree to break off negotiations and say “We made a mistake in 2004 to open negotiations with Turkey.” That simply is not going to happen.

            In reality, the only country that can actually stop the negotiations is Turkey itself. Turkey can say, “We withdraw, we are fed up with it all these vetoes, blockages, it doesn’t lead us anywhere,” and that is of course exactly what the opponents of Turkey’s accession to the EU want it to do. It would make Mr. Sarkozy’s day if Turkey would say this year or at the beginning of next year “We’ve had enough, we will stop.” That is exactly what he is trying to do with all these provocations directed at Turkey. But  I don’t think Turkey will fall for the bait. We might criticize some of its leaders, but I don’t think they are stupid enough to fall into that trap.

            So Turkey will not quit the game. What will happen is that there will be growing frustration inside Turkey about the EU, especially about why EU member states allow Cyprus to play such a pivotal role within the EU in these negotiations. It is a small country and there 26 other states that could overrule it; that has happened in the past with other small countries. But it won’t happen here because there are some countries in the EU that are quite happy with Cyprus out in front trying to stop Turkey--countries like France and Austria.  

            What might happen again if there is no solution to the Cyprus issue is that Turkey-EU negotiations will end in a sort of deadlock. Negotiations will officially remain, but there won’t be any content to them. But no situation can last forever. I think Turkey is hoping  that at the end of the day, countries like the UK, Switzerland, and the Mediterranean countries will put enough pressure on Cyprus to lift its unilateral vetoes. But we cannot be sure of that. It depends how these present negotiations will end.

            So that is one level. The prospects, to be honest are quite dim. I see a 50-50 chance of a Cyprus solution because of my optimistic character. Some might put the possibility of failure at seventy percent. Now, strangely enough, there is a sharp contrast between the official or technical level of negotiations and the political reform process in Turkey. By now, in all the various reports coming out of the EU over the last eight years – the European Commission reports, the European Parliament reports—we have settled on five top issues that Turkey must deal with: the Kurdish issue, the Alawi issue, civil-military relations, relations with Armenia, and writing a new constitution. On all these issues, the Turkish government has come to promise a lot. In that sense 2010 is a make or break year. This time there are a lot of Europeans waiting for the Turkish government to deliver on those promises—which in reality would mean that even if they don’t deliver on all issues, at least in three or four of them there would be huge step forward and it would bring Turkey very close to the EU. 

            So in technical terms the negotiations are almost stuck. But politically, in terms of reform in Turkey,  there is a potential for a lot of progress in 2010. Now the remarkable thing is that in defending or presenting these reforms inside Turkey, there is hardly any reference made to the EU. In past years, in 2003 and 2004 all the major reforms were defended by saying “We need to do this, because we want to join the EU.” That doesn’t happen anymore,  which might seem strange, but  I think it is a smart strategy.  In the past when EU governments sometimes called for unpopular or insensitive reforms in Turkey the Turkish government defended it by saying, “Brussels wants us to do it.” But that argument didn’t strengthen their case. When the Turkish government says “We are doing these things for our own reasons,” as the “Ankara Criteria” not the Copenhagen Criteria—that’s the smart way.

            But there is one important downside to this strategy. It has created among some in Turkey the impression that EU membership is not that important anymore, that Turkey can do all of these things without EU backing or without EU pressure. That is a dangerous perception and dangerous development, because I am still convinced that at the end of the day all these sensitive reforms will only really take place if the EU is in the background quietly supporting the present Turkish government.

             Now the third level, public debate and public opinion. Ian already mentioned IMF reports on Turkey. The biggest group of EU citizens was always more or less undecided about Turkish membership. In 2003 and 2004 most of them said “OK, a lot of good reports have come out on Turkey.” At that time you saw that in Netherlands, France, and Germany a sixty percent majority favored starting negotiations. It included the fifty percent in the middle who stand between the two extremes. But it is also important to note that there will always be at least twenty-five percent, all over Europe, who will always stand against Turkey’s accession for a variety of reasons. I don’t have the time to go into the details on that. And there was twenty-five percent who were more or less positive, and fifty percent  in the middle, especially in the countries where there is a debate on Turkey.

            That is another thing that is important to underline. Yes, there is a debate on Turkey, in the Netherlands, in Austria, in France, and Germany. There is no debate at all about Turkey’s accession in most other countries of the EU member states such as  Scandinavia, UK, Ireland, the Mediterranean countries, the political elites on the right, left or middle—all are in favor of Turkish membership. There is hardly any debate if the general public is asked what their opinion is. Most of them as individuals are not favorable, but it doesn’t matter that much because again most political parties are in favor. In the countries where there is an issue, quite a lot of undecided people oppose Turkey’s accession for reasons that have to do with fear of Islam, fear of migration, fear of globalization. These are big issues again that I can’t get into here.

            The reaction against Turkish membership is an example of where fear of Islam leads to. If you are afraid of Islam, don’t let Turkey in. if you are afraid of migration, keep the Turks out, because they will take our jobs; if you are afraid of globalization, of losing control, then don’t let in such big powerful country as Turkey because it will make it even more difficult for us to govern ourselves.

            This is also related to a second category of objections over internal EU problems or policies. Over the last ten years, the EU has been focused on the constitution and the new rules to govern the EU, to get the EU house in order before turning to any talk of enlargement. OK, that has been done. There is no constitution, but we do have a Lisbon Treaty that deals more or less with a new EU and the new rules of the game that would allow the EU to take in new countries. We did have, of course, a bad experience with EU enlargement in 2007. You shouldn’t underestimate how badly the enlargement of the EU with Romania and Bulgaria played out for Turkey, because a lot of people think that those two countries got in too early and that we should really stop the process now. That caused a lot of resistance within the EU that that is still there.  The global economic crisis also helped focus people’s attention on EU’s domestic problems.

            Now, how do we overcome all of these problems within the EU itself at this point? I really put a lot of emphasis on the difference between the elite level and the popular level in the EU on this issue. What do I mean by that? We’re really talking about EU global leadership. On the elite levels—academics, journalists, politicians to large extent, think-tanks, people who write about the issue, especially EU leaders—have to come grips with the question of whether or not they want the EU to be a global player. Now there is a lot of discussion about whether the EU should be a global player on security issues, on defense, on migration, on climate change;  the EU is, of course, already a global player in world trade.  

            The process has become a little easier for the EU. There is now one person who represents the EU on behalf of the EU itself, but that person should be replicated on all other levels. The rules of the  Lisbon Treaty makes it possible to do that. But there seems to be some lack of political will to really go that way. That is an important consideration for Turkey because if the EU would decide to become a global player, there is a very strong case to point to Turkey as an asset. If you want to be security player in the Middle East, on energy, on relations to Northern Africa, the neighbors to the South—you need Turkey to be a global player. If Europe is undecided about what kind of a player it wants to be in the world then it doesn’t really help Turkey’s case.  

            Even now there is already a great deal for the EU and Turkey to talk about between them when it comes to  issues such as energy, Middle Eastern policy, and Caucasus policy.  They could already start cooperating much more clearly and visibly as a sort of twin track to the more technical, rather dull, not very visible negotiations, that will in any case take quite a bit of  time. If Turkey and the EU can show to EU and Turkish citizens that there is already significant cooperation—the Nabucco pipeline is an example—Turkey would be  well advised to coordinate its new active Middle Eastern policies a little more with the EU to show that it constitutes an asset to Europe, that the EU with Turkey  would be a much stronger player in the Middle East. I am sure that would have a positive influence on the perception in both EU and Turkey.

            We’re speaking here strictly at the elite level of course. Unfortunately it’s been my experience that any kind of joint strategic thinking on energy or long term Middle Eastern policies don’t penetrate very deeply into the popular level. In the Netherlands, you can bring up this argument about Turkey’s strengths in a discussion, but people say “OK, that’s quite nice, but what about Islam, migration, and globalization fears?” So, you need to point out some other factors to convince public opinion within the EU. If people really do see on a popular level in Europe what is happening with democracy, the Kurdish issue, the Alawi issue, if they saw Turkey adopting a more pro-European identity, a European style of dealing with those minority issues, it would really make difference within the EU. That is why it is so important to keep coming back to Turkey to make sure it delivers on those promises; otherwise a lot of people have gotten fed up and tired of  promises of openings when little in the end has been done. A new constitution after the next elections would help a lot.

             I speak to quite a lot of people in Turkey and in the EU who are quite pessimistic. Ian more or less echoed that concern. It may well be the case by the end of this year for technical reasons—but also if there is no delivery on Turkish promises—that Turkey-EU negotiations will be put on a sort of hold. They won’t be stopped, but nothing much will happen either. To prevent that scenario from happening the EU needs to recommit again. It doesn’t really make sense anymore for the UK and the Swiss to say to Turkey, “No, no these objections are only from Mr. Sarkozy. We strongly support you.” There needs to be a show of willingness from Europe as a whole.

            So, this is an important issue for the EU in the long term. That is why the process should not be allowed to get stuck. You need reforms in Turkey to show that Turkey is transforming itself,  to convince not so much the elite in the EU, but to create a popular sense of things changing in Turkey. People would be willing to go back to the 2003 and 2004 position and say, “Yes, it would be a good thing if a more democratic Turkey joins in the EU.”